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IDENTIFICATION
and United States v. Biswel1= as decisions where the
Court had permitted warrantless searches because
they were reasonable under the circumstances.
Important to Mr. Justice White's belief that the
search for aliens was reasonable under the circum-
stances were: the judgment of Congress on immi-
gration; decisions of the fifth, ninth and tenth cir-
cuits;4 and actual alien smuggling practices. 45 The
dissent found compelling the argument that declar-
ing random searches unconstitutional would be
invalidating § 287(a) of the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Act in the face of the contrary opinion
of Congress. 46 In passing § 287(a), Congress obvi-
ously found its provisions reasonable under the
fourth amendment. The majority, however, saw
their actions not as an invalidation of the statute,
but rather as a construction of the statute in a
manner consistent with the fourth amendment. It
felt that no Act of Congress can authorize a viola-
tion of the Constitution.
In urging approval for searches for smuggled
aliens without probable cause, Mr. Justice White
406 U.S. 311 (1972).
4 § 287(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) was declared constitutional in
United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.
1972); accord, United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68
(10th Cir. 1972); Mienke v. United States, 452 F.2d 1076
(9th Cir. 1971).
45 Mr. Justice White noted that aliens had recently
adopted the practice of sitting up behind the back seat
of automobiles with their feet and legs doubled up under
the rear seat cushions. 93 S. Ct. at 2546 (White, J., dis-
senting). Further, aliens sometimes illegally enter the
country on foot and meet prearranged transportation.
Id. at 2552.
"6 Congress permitted warrantless searches of vehicles
for aliens within a reasonable distance from the border
in the Act of August 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 865. Further, in
the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, 66
Stat. 63, it also permitted the entry of private lands,
excluding dwellings, within 25 miles of the border for the
purpose of discovering aliens who had illegally entered
the country.
followed the reasoning of the ninth and tenth cir-
cuits. Both circuits have held that probable cause
is not required for roving immigration searches
within 100 miles of the border, but is required for
roving searches for contraband in automobiles
within the same area.Y Thus, searches for contra-
band alone may be conducted without probable
cause only at the border or its functional equiv-
alent, while searches for smuggled aliens can be
conducted without probable cause anywhere within
100 miles of the border. Neither Mr. justice White
nor the courts involved offered any justification for
the difference between searches for aliens and
searches for contraband."3
By requiring probable cause or consent for roving
searches of automobiles for aliens by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, the Supreme
Court extended fourth amendment rights to an
area previously not covered. However, in light of
the policy considerations involved, it seems un-
likely that the Court will also extend the probable
cause requirement to searches at the border or its
functional equivalent.
" See United States v. Anderson, 468 F.2d 1280 (10th
Cir. 1972); United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129
(5th Cir. 1971); Fumigalli v. United States, 429 F.2d
1011 (9th Cir. 1970). In all three cases, the court held
that probable cause for a search for contraband may
arise during an alien search. In Anderson there was
probable cause when the officers noticed the odor of
marijuana and saw an expended marijuana cigarette in
an ashtray when they stopped the defendant for an
alien search. The court found probable cause in Mc-
Daniel when the Border Patrol agent felt and smelled
marijuana when he opened a burlap bag covered with
newspapers during a search for aliens. Probable cause
existed in Fumigalli when the Border Patrol agent saw
a brick of marijuana protruding from a duffel bag in
the trunk when he stopped the defendant for an alien
search.
18 See United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d
459, 461-68 (9th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion) for a
further discussion of this question.
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United States v. Ash, 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973).
In United States v. Ash,' the United States Su-
preme Court decided that the sixth amendment
guarantee of the right to the assistance of counseF
193 S. Ct. 2568 (1973).
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
should not be extended to a defendant during a
post-indictment photographic identification where
the defendant is not present. The majority opinion,
per Mr. Justice Blackmun, affirmed the conviction
of Charles J. Ash, Jr., holding that an identification
made on the basis of a photographic display in the
absence of the defendant was not a "critical stage"
[Vol. 6
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of the prosecution to which the right to counsel
might attach.
On August 26, 1965, two men held up a bank in
Washington, D.C. The robbery lasted for three or
four minutes. Acting on information supplied by a
government informer, an FBI agent showed five
black-and-white mug shots to four witnesses. Ash's
picture was one of these five; the others approxi-
mately resembled the descriptions given by eye-
witnesses. All of the witnesses made uncertain iden-
tifications of Ash. Ash was arrested and indicted.
The day before the trial commenced, the prosecutor
conducted another photographic display, this time
with color photographs.4 Three of the four wit-
nesses, who had previously made uncertain identi-
fications, selected Ash's picture.
Respondent Ash's counsel was not present at this
identification. The respondent claimed that this
pretrial identification constituted a "critical stage"
of the prosecution, and contended that the absence
of his attorney violated his sixth amendment right
to counsel. 5
In a five-to-four decision, the court of appeals
held that Ash's sixth amendment right to counsel
had been violated. 6 The court cited United States v.
Wade,7 Gilbert v. California and Stovall v. Denno9
for the proposition that the pretrial photographic
identification was a critical stage of the prosecution
and that Ash needed the assistance of counsel if he
was to be guaranteed a fair trial.0 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.n
3 The presence of counsel at a pre-indictment identifi-
cation is not required under the sixth amendment.
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Ash based his
claim solely on the second, post-indictm6ent identifica-
tion.
There is some controversy as to how fairly this
photo display was conducted. The Supreme Court does
not discuss this, but the majority in the court of appeals
noted that only the defendants' pictures were full
length and only their pictures were taken next to height
meters with police numbers attached. United States v.
Ash, 461 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1972). But see id. at 126
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).
5 Evidence of the pretrial identification was first
introduced by the attorney for Ash's codefendant; there
was no question of the prosecution's affirmative use of
the identification.
6 Ash v. United States, 461 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1972).
7 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
9 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
10 461 F.2d at 100.
it The Supreme Court cited a number of lower federal
and state cases holding that Wade will not be extended
to pretrial photo displays: United States ex rd. Reed v.
Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. en banc 1972); United
States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 974 (1972); United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827(6th Cir. 1971); Allen v. Rhay, 431 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.
The five man majority" first looked at the his-
torical rationale for the sixth amendment guarantee
of the right to counsel. They found that the earliest
justification for this guarantee was the need for aid
in combatting the new institution of a public
prosecutor. According to the Court, the core of this
guarantee, the assurance of assistance at trial, was
later expanded to other areas, deemed necessary to
make this assistance at trial meaningful. The Court
then examined the cases which have expanded this
.guarantee!' and resolved that the common factor
was a trial-like confrontation at which the de-
fendant was faced with a legally skilled prosecutor
and had no resources to combat this adversary
alone.
1970); United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1025 (1970); United States v.
Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Haywood v. United States, 396 U.S. 852 (1969); United
States v. Robinson 406 F 2d 64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 926 (1969$; McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d
434 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969). When
Ash was decided in the court of appeals, only the Third
Circuit had extended Wade to photographic identifica-
tions. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir.
1970). This case was overruled in part by Anderson,
suPra.
See also McGhee v. State, 264 So. 2d 560 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1972); State v. Yehling, 108 Ariz. 322, 498 P.2d
145 (1972); People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d
212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204, cerl. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972);
Reed v. State, 281 A.2d 142 (Del. 1971); People v.
Holiday, 4711. 2d 300,N265 N.E.2d 634 (1970); Baldwin
v. State, 5 Md. App. 22, 245 A.2d 98 (1968) (dicta);
Commonwealth v. Ross, 282 NXE.2d 70 (Mass. 1972),
vacated on other grounds and remanded, 410 U.S. 901(1973); Stevenson v. State, 244 So. 2d 30 (Miss. 1971);
State v. Brookins, 468 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1971) (dicta);
People v. Coles, 34 App. Div. 2d 1051,312 N.Y.S.2d 621
(1970) (dicta); State v. Moss, 187 Neb. 391,191 N.W.2d
543 (1971); Drewry v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 186,
191 S.E.2d 178 (1972); State v. Nettles, 81 Wash. 2d
205, 500 P.2d 752 (1972); Kain v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 212,
179 N.W2d 777 (1970).
See for state courts which have extended Wade, Cox
v. State, 219 So. 2d 762 (Fla. App. 1969) (video tapes);
People v. Anderson 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461
(1973); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 400
U.S. 919 (1970). See for a more complete list, 461 F.2d
at 110-112, nn. 16-29.
1Chief justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Rehnquist, Powell and White joined in the majority.
A concurring opinion was submitted by Justice Stewart.
Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion, joined
by Justices Douglas and Marshall.
"Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (prelimi-
nary hearing is a critical stage); United States v. Wade,
388 U. S. 218 (1967) (pretrial line-up is a critical
stage); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)(pretrial interview with defendant is a critical stage);
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (expanding
Hamilton, infra, to encompass all arraignments, regard-
less of state law); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961) (under Alabama law, arraignment must be a
critical stage to which guarantee must attach); Powell
1973]
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From this perspective the Court viewed the right
to counsel as simply the right of the accused to
have counsel acting as his assistant.14 In Hamilton
v. Alabama 5 and White v. Maryland,6 counsel could
act as an assistant at the arraignment stage, giving
advice on all available defenses, so that the de-
fendant could make an intelligent plea. In Massiah
v. United States" defendant's right to counsel con-
sisted of the right to be advised as to his fifth
amendment privileges and to be protected from
overreaching by the state during a surreptitious
pretrial interview. In Coleman v. Alabama's the
Court stated that it is counsel's legal skills in cross-
examining, in probing for evidence and in present-
ing legal arguments which make his presence at the
preliminary hearing necessary. 19
In light of the historical rationale, the majority
asserted that Wade requires the presence of counsel
where counsel can assist in preserving the propriety
of the line-up identification and aid in the recon-
struction of the line-up at trial. The majority ruled
that the right to counsel attaches only when the
defendant needs aid in coping with legal problems
and assistance in meeting his skilled adversaries.20
The majority's test of criticalness was: Is the situa-
tion a trial-like, adversary confrontation at which
counsel is necessary to assist the defendant in
handling legal problems or in combatting the pro-
secutor?
The majority said the Wade opinion emphasized
the need for counsel at "confrontations." Blackmun
argued that neither the lack of scientific precision
in identifications nor the need for legal assistance
to facilitate. reconstruction of the identification at
the time of trail gave rise to the need for counsel in
Wade. These were not tests to see if the assistance
of counsel is a necessity. Rather, these were tests to
see if confrontation at trial is an adequate substi-
tute for the pretrial confrontation.1 Photographic
displays are not confrontations. The defendant is
not even present. Photo displays are more similar
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel, to be
meaningful, must attach during the period of prepara-
tion prior to the trial itself).
14 93 S. Ct. at 2575.
15 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
16 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
17 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
1 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
19 These interpretations are those of the majority.
In some of these cases, the interpretation is question-
able, e.g., Coleman. See discussion of that case and note
38, infra.
20 The Court calls this the "traditional" test. 93 S.
Ct. at 2575.
21Id. at 2577.
to the interviews routinely conducted by the pros-
ecutor in preparing his witnesses. To expand the
guarantee out of the context of a confrontation
would be far too drastic a step."
In comparing Ash's situation to the general right
to counsel case, the majority found that no guaran-
tee need attach. Since the defendant was not pres-
ent, there was no problem with his lack of knowl-
edge of legal matters nor any fear of overpowering
by a skilled adversary. There was no need to
equalize any trial-like, adversary confrontation.
The Court held that a photo display was only part
of the prosecutor's trial preparation and that the
defendant's counter-balance rested on the defense
attorney's ability to interview the same witnesses.
No extra consideration must be given to the de-
fendant. The Court also pointed out that Brady v.
Maryland 3 allowed the defense attorney to secure
any favorable evidence in the hands of the prose-
cution.
In sum, the Court held that when the defendant
is not present there is no confrontation, and when
there is no confrontation there is no situation which
will give rise to a need for counsel.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justide Stewart also
ruled that the pretrial photographic identification
was not a critical stage, but for a decidedly differ-
ent reason.'4 His definition of criticalness empha-
sized what the lawyer can do at the critical stage
to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Quoting from both Wade 5 and Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte,26 Stewart said that when there is a possi-
bility of unfair influence at the identification, there
is a possibility that this will result in an unfair
trial. The lawyer, then, is needed as a trained ob-
server, to meaningfully confront the in-court iden-
tifications made by witnesses and to better recon-
struct the procedure of the pretrial identification.
It is this emphasis upon the trial itself and the
lawyer's assistance at that time which makes
Stewart's reading of Wade different from that of
the majority.
12 Id. at 2577.
"373 U.S. 83 (1963).
', 93 S. Ct. at 2581, n. 1 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"1In United States v. Wade, supra, the Court
determined that a pretrial proceeding is a "critical
stage" if "the presence of ... counsel is necessary to
preserve the defendant's... right meaningfully to
cross-examine the witnesses against him and to
have effective assistance of counsel at the trial
itself."
Id. at 2580 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26 "Pretrial proceedings are 'critical,' then, if the
presence of counsel is essential 'to protect the fairness
of the trial itself.' "Id.
[Vol. 64
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However, Stewart goes on to say that a photo-
graphic identification is not a critical stage since
counsel can not give better assistance at trial
merely by being at the photo display. According to
Stewart, the photographic line-up affords fewer
possibilities of suggestion than the liie-up identifi-
cation and can be easily reconstructed at trial. If
the lawyer suspects foul play, he can attack the
identification through questioning of the witnesses
prior to and at the trial. Stewart also saw little
difference in a photo display and other prosecu-
torial, pretrial, interviewing techniques.
The dissenting opinion agreed with the inter-
pretation of Wade given by Mr. Justice Stewart,
but asserted that a post-indictment photographic
identification is a critical stage of the criminal pro-
ceedings, to which the right to counsel attaches.
The dissenters reviewed Wade and attempted to
clarify the definition of a critical stage. They saw
the Wade argument as: (1) the defendant's inability
to reconstruct at trial the pretrial lineup proceed-
ings deprives the defendant of his opportunity to
meaningfully attack the credibility of the witness'
in-court identification; (2) as a conviction may rest
on this in-court identification, which might be the
fruit of a pretrial identification which the defendant
is unable to subject to courtroom scrutiny, the de-
fendant loses his right to cross-examine the wit-
nesses, an essential part of his right to confront the
witnesses against him; and (3) therefore the line-up
is a critical stage to which the sixth amendment
guarantee must attach, since the presence of coun-
sel at the pretrial line-up is the only way to avert
any prejudice and assure a meaningful confronta-
tion at the trial.
The dissenters decided that a photographic iden-
tification falls within this framework. The possibil-
ity of suggestive influence, prejudicing in-court
identifications, is inherent in all identifications,27
and the mere presence of the pictures at trial does
not guarantee the ability to reconstruct the proce-
dures of the display. Since this chance of prejudice
exists, and since the only way to attack the pre-
judice is to have first-hand knowledge of the identi-
fication procedures (something an absent defendant
2 The possibility of suggestion in a photo display can
arise from the photographs themselves (they might
contain a picture of the 20 year old accused and four
photos of middle-aged men), from the manner in which
they are displayed (a special configuration could tend to
draw one's attention to a particular picture), or from the
demeanor of the prosecutor as he conducts the display(this could be anything from gestures and comments to
coughs and smiles). See id. at 2585 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
cannot possibly have), counsel is necessary at a
post-indictment, pretrial, photographic identifica-
tion to assure the defendant's right to a fair trial.
The dissent finally addressed the reasoning of
the majority ruling. The dissenters said that the
new definition of "critical stage" was only con-
cerned with one facet of the right to counsel-what
the lawyer can do for his client then and there. It
ignored the other, equally important facet of the
lawyer's assistance in protecting the defendant's
right to a fair trial after the identification. The dis-
sent reiterated that the new definition, with its
emphasis on trial-like confrontations at which the
lawyer can aid in answering legal questions and
help in combatting the prosecutor, might, in some
cases, deprive the defendant of legal assistance at
the only time when such aid would help.2
The three opinions of Ash are the latest in a series
of attempts to handle the issue of "the critical
stage." It was recognized early that the guarantee
must, in certain cases, attach before the trial itself.
As each new situation arose, the Supreme Court
examined the facts and made a decision as to the
criticalness of that particular stage.29 The issues in
these cases can always be reduced to their major
component: What is a critical stage? The dissent in
Ash maintained that this question has two facets.
A stage of the prosecution is critical if the lawyer
can provide immediate assistance at a confronta-
tion or if his presence is necessary to assure a mean-
ingful "defence" at the trial itself. This double
emphasis is supported by the previous cases. In
Hamilton the Court listed the possible prejudices
of an arraignment without counsel and concluded
that the risks were serious since a poorly conducted
arraignment might affect "the whole trial." 10 The
Hamilton Court also recognized the importance of
the lawyer's immediate assistance, concluding that
counsel might have informed the defendant of all
available defenses, thereby allowing the accused to
plead intelligently.n This two-faceted approach to
defining a critical stage is evident in Coleman as
well. The Court listed the benefits of counsel at a
preliminary hearing, two of which pertain to the
immediate assistance a lawyer could render, two of
which look towards the lawyer's work at the trial
itself."
21 Id. at 2589 (Brennan, J., dissenting).2" See note 13 supra.
20 368 U.S. at 54.
31 Id. at 55.
n Counsel is necessary at a preliminary hearing be-
cause (1) his skilled examination and cross-examination
of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the state's
19731
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The majority in Ash ignored this two-faceted
definition of criticalness by emphasizing only what
the lawyer can accomplish then and there. The
majority was also at odds with the Wade decision.
Despite the majority's stress upon the Wade
Court's use of the word "confrontation," 1 there
is abundant evidence that the primary concern of
the Supreme Court in Wade was the defendant's
right to a fair trial. The Court framed the question
in terms of Wade's "most basic right to a fair
trial." 14 Wade emphasized the sixth amendment as-
surance of a meaningful "defence." 3 The Wade
Court recognized that counsel could give legal as-
sistance on the spot,36 but they also included con-
sideration of the trial:
In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and suc-
ceeding cases requires that we scrutinize any pre-
trial confrontation of the accused to determine
whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to
preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial
as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-
examine the witnesses against him and to have
effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.n
Clearly, this shows the concern the Wade Court had
for the trial itself. Yet the majority's historical
case which may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind
over the defendant (immediate assistance), (2) his
examination or cross-examination can be good for im-
peachment at trial or can preserve testimony of a wit-
ness who does not appear at trial (emphasis on trial
itself), (3) he can more effectively discover the case
against the defendant and prepare a proper defense(emphasis on trial itself), and (4) hecan make an effec-
tive argument for the accused on matters such as bail
or the necessity for an early psychiatric exam (immedi-
ate assistance). 399 U.S. at 9.
The majority, in discussing Coleman, have ignored
the emphasis upon the defense attorney's preparation
for the trial in favor of the immediate assistance counsel
could provide. See 93 S. Ct. at 2575.
33 93 S. Ct. at 2576, n.9. But see discussion on this in
the dissenting opinion, id. at 2589-90 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
34 "[11n this case it is urged that the assistance of
counsel at the line-up was indispensable to protect
Wade's most basic right to a fair trial at which the
witnesses against him might be ineaningfully cross-
examined." 388 U.S. at 223-24.
35 "The plain wording of this guarantee thus encom-
passes counsel's assistance whenever necessary to
assure a 'defence.' "Id. at 225.
36 The Wade majority quotes from Hamilton: " 'What
happens there [at the arraignment] may affect the whole
trial. Available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if
not then and there asserted .... '" Id. at 225. "The
presence of counsel at such confrontations, as at the
trial itself, operates to assure that the accused's interests
will be protected consistently with our adversary theory
of criminal prosecution."
Id. at 227.
7 Id. at 227. See also the dissent's discussion, 93 S.
Ct. at 2589-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
analysis in Ash led them to the conclusion that the
lawyer's assistance is limited to the immediate aid
which he can give to his client.
The immediate effect of Ask will betoallowpros-
ecutors to conduct pretrial photographic identifi-
cations without the defendant or his attorney pres-
ent. Photo displays will, in effect, become part of
the prosecutor's trial preparation.
However, Ash does not dear up the confusion
which existed in this area prior to the decision."
s This confusion is evidenced by the fact that the
last three major cases on this issue (Wade, Coleman and
Kirby) resulted in plurality decisions.
The mechanics of the Wade decision is an excellent
example of the confusion which attends this area of the
law. Seven opinions were filed. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
There was the official opinion of the Court delivered by
Mr. Justice Brennan, the opinion of Mr. Justice Clark,
concurring in result, the opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas,joined by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, dissenting in part and concurring in part, the
separate opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in part and concurring
in part, the opinion of Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in
part and concurring in part and the opinion of Mr.
Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr.
Justice Stewart, also dissenting in part and concurring
in part. The following is a chart designed to display
which justices agreed on which issues. As can be seen,
it appears to be happenstance that any part of the





I Line-up and speaking not a Brennan Warren




II The sixth amendment guar- Brennan White]
antee is the presence of Warren Harlan
counsel to preserve right Douglas Stewart
to a fair trial and a mean- Fortas
ingful confrontation and Black
"defence." Clark
III Pretrial identification at Brennan
line-up not the same as Warren
interviews, fingerprinting, Douglas
etc., and are not part of Fortas





IV Pretrial identification at Brennan White
line-up is a situation in Warren Harlan
which presence of counsel Douglas Stewart
is necessary as inter- Fortas
preted in Part If. Clark
Black
[Vol. 64
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From out of the confusion created by the past
plurality decisions, the Court in Ash attempted to
construct a narrow definition of criticalness based
upon the right to counsel being extended only when
an attorney could be of immediate assistance. In-
stead, by ignoring the obvious emphases of previous
decisions concerning the trial-oriented assistance of
counsel, the Court has added more fuel to a fire
already burning out of control.
How will this narrow definition of criticalness
work in the situations in which it has been claimed
a lawyer is necessary? In post-indictment line-ups,
it is not readily apparent what immediate assist-
ance an attorney can provide. He cannot stop the
line-up or see that it be conducted in a certain man-
ner. He can give no legal advice, proffer no de-
fenses, advance no arguments. 9 The defendant is
not in need of legal advice and the lawyer is not
in a position to provide on the spot assistance
against the skills of the prosecutor. In fact, his only
recognized function is as a trained observer. Would
the Ash Court say that the post-indictment line-up
is a critical stage because the lawyer is needed as
an observer? If that is the case, then he is as much
needed in a photo display case. The future of the
right to counsel at post-indictment line-ups under





V Actual order. Presumption Bxennan White
that an identification Warren Harlan
without counsel taints in- Douglas Stewart
court identification unless Fortas Black




Further confusion is added when one attempts to draw
the distinction between photographic identifications and
corporeal identifications. Stewart and the dissent fall on
different sides of this issue. It is difficult to say exactly
what distinction the majority finds, if any. In Wade,
Mr. Justice White does not seem to make a distinction
in his opinion: "The rule [of the majority in Wade] ap-
plies to any line-up, to any other techniques employed
to produce an identification... ." Id. at 251 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is difficult
to tell, in light of his concurrence in Ash, if he has
changed his mind.
3,See generally 93 S. Ct. at 2577 (majority's quote
from United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (1969)).
41This new criticalness definition makes the doubtful
line drawn in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972),
even more questionable. If what is necessary is a trial-
The decision in Ash leads to even more confusion
when approached from a narrower, procedural
standpoint. Implicit in denying the sixth amend-
ment claim as the Ash majority did, is the assump-
tion that the remedy for foul play at a photographic
identification is a due process attack as in Simmons
v. United Stat.a If the defendant is not allowed
counsel at the identification his only remedy
against a tainted in-court identification is to attack
the procedures used at the photo display. This
safeguard is cited by the Court.* The harshness of
the majority decision is partially assuaged by their
belief that a photographic identification can be
duplicated at trial. 3 A problem then arises when
the photo display is conducted, but the photo-
graphs disappear before the trial commences. If
the ability to duplicate the pretrial identification is
gone, would not that be a violation of the de-
fendant's right to due process, for how can his
attorney meaningfully conduct his defense when
the photographs, which may or may not form the
basis for an in-court identification, are missing? In
at least one state, Illinois, it has recently been de-
cided that it is not absolutely necessary for the
like, adversary confrontation at which the defendant
needs aid only his lawyer can give, that is all present at
pre-indictment line-ups as much as it is at post-indict-
ment line-ups. If the emphasis is an immediate aid of
counsel in combatting adversaries, the pre-indictment
or post-indictment distinction is not significant. Granted
the prosecutor is usually not present at pre-indictment
line-ups, thereby lessening the "confrontation" aspect.
Does that then mean that if the prosecutor does not
show up at post-indictment line-ups, counsel is no
longer required? Or conversely, can the defendant claim
a right to counsel if the prosecutor participates in a pre-
indictment line-up? See 63 J. Cmm. L. & C. 478 (1972).
41390 U.S. 377 (1967). After Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967), held that Wade was not to be applied
retroactively, defendants were left with a due process
attack if they wished to challenge a photographic dis-
play. If the defendant claims that a photo identification
was misused or improperly conducted, the trial court
must examine the situation in light of the totality of the
circumstances, and "that conviction based on eye-
witness identification at trial following a pretrail identi-
fication by photograph will be set aside on that ground
only if the photographic identification procedure was so
impermissively suggestive as to give rise to a very sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."
390 U.S. at 384.
4293 S. Ct. at 2574.
43 "Although we do not suggest that equality of access
to photographs removes all potential for abuse [note
omitted], it does remove any inequality in the adversary
process itself and thereby fully satisfies the historical
spirit of the Sixth Amendment guarantee." Id. at 2578.
A forliori, if the photographs are not available, the
defendant would be denied equal access and the "histori-
cal spirit" would go unsatisfied. Can the defense at-
torney show "impermissible suggestion" without the
photographs?
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